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As the importance of online grocery shopping increases, both pure-play online grocers and 
multichannel grocers are likely to be interested in setting optimal prices for their online stores. We use a 
unique household scanner panel dataset to investigate how a grocery retailer with both online and offline 
stores can set prices for its online store. We observe the same households shopping interchangeably at 
the online and offline stores of the same grocery chain and investigate their purchase behavior in 
specific product categories. We find that across three product categories, these households exhibit lower 
price sensitivities when shopping online than offline. In addition, a household’s price sensitivity is 
inversely related to distance to the closest physical store. We compute the retailer’s category profit-
maximizing prices for the online store and explore several alternative pricing schemes that are consistent 
with the retailer’s current price image. We find that the retailer can substantially increase its profits from 
online operations by fine tuning its current pricing policy. Given the estimated inverse relationship 
between price sensitivity and store distance, we investigate online zone pricing as a price discrimination 
tool based on residential location and find that the retailer can further improve store profits. We examine 
the potential mechanism to assign zones and determine the optimal number of pricing zones. 
 





The potential mismatch between retailers’ pricing behavior and consumers’ shopping behavior at 
online grocery stores is striking. On the one hand, grocery retailers strive to offer competitive prices in 
the online store or to match online prices to those at offline stores. For example, the world’s leading 
online grocery store, www.tesco.com, uses price checks to guarantee low prices: “Never pay more for 
your branded shop. Buy 10 or more different products and we’ll price match your branded shop if it’s 
cheaper at Asda, Morrisons or Sainsbury’s.” www.ocado.com, under its “low price promise,” states, 
“We check your comparable shopping against the listed prices at tesco.com.”  
On the other hand, studies find that consumers either do not consider price as the most important 
factor in choosing an online store for grocery shopping or are less price sensitive when buying groceries 
online. In a survey by Cude and Morganosky (2000), 73% of e-grocery shoppers report convenience and 
time saving as the primary reasons for using the Internet to buy groceries. A report on German 
consumers (A.T. Kearney 2012) found that time saving is more important than price for consumers who 
shop for groceries online. Studies (e.g., Andrews and Currim 2004, Chu et al. 2008) have shown that 
online grocery shoppers are less price sensitive than their offline counterparts. It is reasonable to believe 
that supermarkets are eager to preserve their price image (Johnson 2002; Simester 1995; Urbany, 
Dickson and Sawyer 2000).2 Nevertheless, if online price elasticities are lower than offline ones, a 
legitimate question is, “Can online retailers do better than simply matching online prices to prices in 
their conventional or offline stores?” 
In this paper, we investigate how a grocery retailer with both online and offline stores can fine tune 
prices for the online store and use the interactive nature of the online shopping medium to better price 
                                                 
2 Interestingly, the online grocery store Peapod, which sourced its products from Stop & Shop supermarkets in Boston, 
advertised that its prices were comparable to those in offline stores. However, in 2001 the firms agreed to pay $250,000 in 
restitution and penalties to online customers who claimed they were charged more. They also stopped advertising that home 
delivery items are on par or competitive with supermarket prices.  
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discriminate among online shoppers; technically, retailers can charge different consumers different 
prices for the same product in an online store. It is easy to track consumers’ browsing and shopping 
activities and other individual information, such as IP and delivery address, in an online shopping 
environment, which can be used to measure consumers’ price sensitivity and shopping preferences.  
We focus on the online pricing issue for several reasons. First, online pricing is particularly relevant 
for this grocery retailer, because the retailer has been in business for a long time and is much more 
experienced in setting prices for its offline stores. In contrast, the retailer lacks experience in pricing for 
the Internet store due to the relatively nascent nature of the online channel and the short duration of the 
retailer’s involvement in that channel. This is not specific to this retailer, but common to many grocers 
who either just launched their online operations or are considering doing so. Second, the retailer in our 
analysis chose to mimic the prices from its higher-priced offline stores when setting prices for the online 
store3. This leads us to believe, first, that the retailer may have been aware that online shoppers tend to 
be less price sensitive, and second, that there could be room for fine tuning prices at the online store to 
improve profits. Third, as will be described in the data section, our panel of households is a 
representative sample of online shoppers. Therefore, we can experiment with online pricing based on 
this panel’s shopping behavior and apply it to the reatiler’s entire online clientele. However, we do not 
think we can derive any pricing policies for the offline stores from this panel’s shopping behavior, 
because the panel households are likely to behave differently from households that have never shopped 
online.  
We focus on a subset of product categories that do not account for a substantial proportion of the 
shopping basket in order to avoid store traffic and store competition-related issues. Two key inputs are 
required to address the retailer’s online pricing issue. First, we need to understand how consumers 
                                                 
3 The retailer currently practices uniform pricing across online and offline stores.  
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behave when they shop for these product categories, and specifically whether consumers are more or 
less price sensitive when shopping online than shopping at offline stores. We accomplish this by jointly 
estimating demand for the items in each product category in the online and offline stores. The second 
key input required to compute optimal prices is the retailer’s wholesale prices, which are not observed in 
the data. Conversations with the retailer reveal that the retailer’s gross margin is about 25% across all 
product categories. Hence, we assume marginal costs for all items are 75% of retail prices as a crude 
approximation to wholesale prices, and assess the sensitivity of our results to the 25% margin 
assumption. 
Our analysis is based on a unique household scanner panel dataset. We observe the same panel of 
households that make grocery shopping trips interchangeably to the Internet store and the physical stores 
of the same grocery chain. For each trip, we observe the entire basket of packaged goods and non-
packaged goods. Our empirical analysis is conducted on three categories: frozen pizza, liquid dish 
detergent, and packed oranges. We use the frozen pizza category to illustrate the model setup and 
estimation. For other categories, we only report the impact on retail profitability of optimal online 
pricing and optimal online zone pricing. 
We specify a random coefficients logit model for purchase incidence and brand choice conditional 
on store choice. Quantity choices are accounted for by explicitly incorporating different package sizes 
into the model specification. Our estimation accounts for observed and unobserved household 
heterogeneity. To investigate household behavior across online and offline channels, we allow the 
distribution of the price coefficient (both mean and standard deviation), the effects of demographics on 
price response, and the effects of outside good utility shifters to differ across these two channels. We 
also account for the presence of unobserved time-varying product attributes that may be correlated with 
observed prices in the data (Chintagunta, Dubé and Goh 2004; Villas-Boas and Winer 1999). Hence, our 
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estimation explicitly accounts for price endogeneity.  
Our results indicate that households exhibit lower price sensitivities when shopping online than 
offline. A household’s price sensitivity is inversely related to its distance from the closest physical store. 
With demand parameter estimates and assumed marginal costs, we conduct a variety of pricing 
experiments for the online store. As prices are not separated into regular price and promotional price, 
our focus is on obtaining the average price across weeks, as in Chintagunta, Dubé, and Singh (2003). 
We first compute the optimal prices under no constraints on the retailer’s pricing behavior and find that 
retail profits in the frozen pizza category will increase by 18% under the optimal prices. Profit 
improvement under the optimal online pricing will be 38% and 24%, respectively, for packed oranges 
and liquid dish detergent. Next, if the retailer is concerned about its price image, we impose several 
constraints on pricing to study their impact on profits. We find that there is still significant room for 
retailers to improve profits. 
Since a household’s price sensitivity is inversely related to its home–store distance, we experiment 
with online zone pricing by grouping households into two price zones based on their distances to stores, 
with 0.6 km as the cutoff point. We find that for the frozen pizza category, profits will further improve 
by 7% over the uniform optimal online prices (assuming 25% retail margin). The profit improvement 
under online zone pricing over the uniform optimal prices is 4% and 14% for liquid dish detergent and 
packed oranges, respectively. 
To test whether our results are sensitive to the cutoff point, we use various cutoff points for the two 
pricing zones. We find a similar profit impact, which is due to the almost linear correlation between 
consumers’ price sensitivities and distance to stores (Figure 2). We then examine whether the number of 
zones influences the results and find that the number of zones does not change the results in all three 
categories. Our inference is that the number of optimal pricing zones depends on the degree of online 
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consumer heterogeneity in price sensitivity, and two pricing zones are sufficient for this retailer. 
However, we do not address the associated implementation issues for such a pricing scheme. 
Our major contributions are as follows. First, we examine the retailer’s pricing policy at the online 
store based on the same households’ lower online than offline price sensitivities. This will help 
conventional grocers and pure-play Internet grocers set optimal prices for their online stores, and thus 
increase store profits. Given the razor-thin margin in the grocery industry, grocery retailers will 
welcome any methods that can improve the retail margin. Second, while researchers and practitioners 
have discussed the idea of online zone pricing, little has been documented on the potential profitability 
of such a policy. We experiment with online zone pricing based on a household’s residential location 
and shed some light on this issue. We explore the mechanism to determine optimal cutoff points for 
online pricing zones and number of pricing zones. Third, recent research on grocery retailers’ optimal 
pricing uses store-level data (e.g., Chintagunta et al. 2003; Montgomery 1997). In this research, we 
investigate optimal pricing with household panel data. Thus, we are able to better control for unobserved 
household heterogeneity, which could potentially bias the estimated price effect and hence optimal 
prices. However, unlike those studies using household data (e.g., Tellis and Zufryden 1995; Vilcassim 
and Chintagunta 1995), we account for price endogeneity in addition to dealing with both sources of 
household heterogeneity.  
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. We review the related literature on optimal pricing in 
Section 2 and describe the data in Section 3. We set up the econometric model in Section 4 and detail 
the estimation in Section 5. We report empirical findings and robustness checks in Section 6 and 
conclude in Section 7 with directions for further research. 
2. Literature Review 
As the importance of the Internet as a shopping channel increases, many conventional grocery 
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retailers have launched online operations. Some pure-play online grocers either operate independently or 
partner with brick-and-mortar retailers; for instance, Instacart partners with stores such as Costco or 
Target. According to some reports (Nielsen 2015), 12% of US consumers purchased groceries online in 
2014.  After successfully launching its grocery store in the US in 2006, online giant Amazon launched 
its UK grocery website in 2010, and expanded later to other countries, posing a direct challenge to 
existing supermarket groups. In 2016, Google started to deliver fresh groceries. 
Research on online grocery shopping has focused on comparing features, such as price sensitivities 
and brand loyalty, across online and offline channels (Andrews and Currim 2004; Chu, Chintagunta and 
Cebollada 2008; Chu et al. 2010; Danaher, Wilson and Davis 2003; Degeratu, Rangaswamy and Wu 
2001). Zhang and Krishnamurthi (2004) use a household panel dataset of online purchases to measure 
the impact of promotions on households’ purchase incidence, brand choice, and quantity demand, and 
use demand parameters to study the customization of promotions in the pure-play online grocery store. 
Lewis, Singh, and Fay (2006) find a significant effect of nonlinear shipping and handling fees on 
consumers’ purchase incidence and expenditure decisions when buying groceries online. These two 
studies only consider online stores; in contrast, our study examines the pricing policy for the online store 
of a grocery retailer that also has offline operations.  
Researchers have investigated various pricing policies for offline grocery retailers to increase 
profitability, using both household panel data and store scanner data. Vilcassim and Chintagunta (1995) 
study optimal retailer category pricing policies and show how household scanner panel data can be used 
to determine optimal retail prices (see also Kim, Blattberg and Rossi 1995). Tellis and Zufryden (1995) 
model the optimal timing and depth of retail discounts with the optimal timing and quantity of the 
retailer’s order over multiple brands and time periods. Their analysis is based on households’ purchase 
incidence, brand choice, and quantity decisions, along with the dynamics of household and retail 
inventory. We differ from these studies substantively, in that we focus on the online store and 
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differences in behavior across online and offline channels. We also differ methodologically, in that we 
explicitly account for price endogeneity in the estimation of demand parameters at the household level. 
Montgomery (1997) looks at the profit implications of zone and store pricing for a supermarket chain in 
one specific product category with store-level data. Chintagunta et al. (2003) examine optimal pricing 
based on observed demographics and competitive factors that can be linked to store demand 
characteristics. Khan and Jain (2005) investigate the impact of micro pricing and quantity discounts on 
retail profitability. These studies use store-level data and are limited to offline stores, while our study 
uses household scanner data and focuses on the online shopping environment, which has been much less 
investigated than conventional stores.  
3. Data 
3.1 The grocery retailer  
Our data come from a major grocery retail chain in Spain. The data are for one metro area, in which 
the retailer had 200 physical stores and a market share slightly lower than the largest grocery chain. The 
retailer started online operations in 2001. It was the only successful online grocery store in Spain during 
the data period, and is now the leading online grocery retailer in Spain. The online store partnered with 
17 physical stores in the chain for grocery supply. The chain uses a centralized online ordering system. 
After receiving an online order, it assigns the order to one of the partner stores and notifies the 
household. The household then has two options: It can either go to the assigned partner store to pick up 
the order for free or have the basket delivered within some chosen delivery time window (e.g., 7-9pm 
Monday) with delivery charges. The home delivery charge is €4.5 for orders less than €90 and free 
otherwise. An important feature of grocery stores in the metro area is that they do not always have 
parking lots, and households usually walk or take public transport to do grocery shopping. About 60% of 
the physical stores in this chain also provide home delivery service. The delivery charge is €3.5 for 
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orders below €90 and free otherwise.4 In Figure 1, we plot a histogram for online basket size and find 
high frequencies of online basket size between €95-€100 and €100-€105, and considerably lower 
frequencies of online basket size between €80-€85 and €85-€90. This means that the free delivery 
threshold causes consumers to make more purchases at the margin to get the free delivery service. 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
The retailer has a hi-low chain-wide promotion policy and practices zone pricing for the offline 
stores. There are two offline price zones. Roughly, stores in the suburban area belong to the low-price 
zone, and those in the urban area belong to the high-price zone. However, average prices across all 
categories in the high-price zone are about 3% higher than the low-price zone, implying that price 
elasticities are not likely to be very different across the two zones. Importantly, when this retailer started 
its online business, it did not change its pricing policy for the offline stores, nor did it have a new pricing 
policy for the online store different from its offline zone prices. Rather, it used the prices in the high-
price offline zone for the online store. Price cuts are the same across channels. The retailer’s store weeks 
coincide with calendar weeks. Promotions are usually run on a multi-weekly basis, so weekday prices 
are the same as weekend prices.  
3.2 Household panel data 
We obtained panel data on 2,733 households from this retailer, which is a random sample of the 
retailer’s online shoppers. To be included in the panel, the household must have made at least one online 
purchase at the retailer’s online store prior to the data collection. Thus, all households in our panel are 
online shoppers, though some did not make any online purchases during the data period. This means that 
our panel may not be a representative sample for offline shoppers. For these households, we observe all 
of their trips to both the online and offline stores of this grocery chain from December 2002 to 
                                                 
4 The retailer now charges for all deliveries: €4 for orders greater than €100 and €6 otherwise. The change in the delivery policy 
occurred after our data collection.  
11 
 
November 2003. For each trip, we observe the entire basket of both packaged and non-packaged goods. 
For each item, we have prices, units bought, and detailed item descriptions. We compute home-store 
distance between the households and each of the stores based on each household’s postal code and each 
store’s street location. We also gather postal code-specific income data from the Instituto Nacional de 
Estadistica (Spanish Statistical Office) and match the income data with households by postal code. 
One interesting pattern in the data is that the availability of the Internet option does not act as a 
sorting mechanism by which certain households mainly shop online and others mainly shop offline. Of 
all households in the panel, 89.0% are “mixed” shoppers—i.e., they shop at both the online and offline 
stores; 10.2% are pure online shoppers; and .8% are pure offline shoppers. The dropout rate among 
online shoppers is very low, in contrast to what is found in other studies (Danaher, Wilson and Davis 
2003). There are no significant differences in observed demographics across pure online shoppers and 
mixed shoppers. For example, the mean family size and number of adults for pure online shoppers are 
2.90 (standard deviation or s.d.=1.73) and 2.33 (s.d.=1.53), respectively, and the corresponding numbers 
for mixed shoppers are 3.39 (s.d.=1.41) and 2.26 (s.d.=1.01). Hence, while demographics may still 
explain differences in price sensitivities across households, differences in price sensitivities across 
channels are more likely attributable to the channels themselves. 
The households on average made 43.3 shopping trips during the one-year period: 16.6% were trips 
to the online store and 83.4% to offline stores. However, the online store accounts for 37.9% of grocery 
spending. Consequently, the online basket (€128) is three times larger than the offline basket (€43). 
Mixed shoppers made 49.4 trips total, with 6.6 online trips and 42.8 offline trips. Pure online shoppers 
made 13 trips, and pure offline shoppers made 56 trips.  
It is useful to note how mixed shoppers behave when shopping online and offline. In terms of basket 
size and numbers of categories and items bought on each trip, they behave in a similar way to pure 
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online shoppers when shopping online and in a similar way to pure offline shoppers when shopping 
offline. The online basket is €129.5 for mixed shoppers and €121.2 for pure online shoppers. The offline 
basket is €43.1 for mixed shoppers and €43.3 for pure offline shoppers. Mixed shoppers buy 29 
categories and 41 items on an average online trip; the corresponding numbers for pure online shoppers 
are 22 and 31, respectively. Mixed shoppers buy 12 categories and 16 items on an offline trip; the 
numbers for pure offline shoppers are 13 and 17 (Table 1), respectively. It appears that the shopping 
medium changes consumers’ buying behavior, and the same consumers behave differently in the online 
medium and the offline medium. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
3.3 The frozen pizza category 
Of all households in the sample, 1,514 make at least one purchase in the frozen pizza category: 37% 
live in the low-price zone and 63% in the high-price zone. There do not appear to be large differences in 
the demographics of pizza buyers across zones (Table 2). Of these pizza buyers, 4.4% are pure online 
shoppers, 4.2% are pure offline shoppers, and 91.4% are mixed shoppers. Again, there are no significant 
differences in the observed demographics across different types of shoppers. 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
Three reasons make the frozen pizza category (and other two categories as well) attractive for our 
analysis. First, in contrast to big categories like yogurt (4.72% basket share) and milk (4.31% basket 
share), frozen pizzas only account for .77% basket share. Unlike large categories, promotions of frozen 
pizzas do not appear to drive store traffic. Table 3 shows the store traffic and purchase incidences in 
these product categories during promotion and non-promotion weeks. The t-statistic for the difference in 
mean store traffic across promotion and non-promotion weeks is –0.38 for frozen pizza, 2.55 for yogurt, 
and 2.32 for milk. At the same time, households do seem to respond to promotions by making more 
purchases in this category: The t-statistic for the difference in purchase incidence across promotion and 
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non-promotion weeks is 1.86.5 These findings for the frozen pizza category imply that we can model 
households’ purchase incidence and brand choice conditional on their store choice decisions. Further, 
the pricing experiments we conduct for the online store are less likely to change households’ store 
choice behavior, although price changes will likely alter their purchase incidence and brand choice 
behavior. Second, it is very unlikely that households will dramatically change their consumption 
pattern—i.e., that they will consume more or fewer frozen pizzas simply because of the availability of 
the online option, because frozen pizzas are neither bulky nor heavy. Third, purchase quantities are not 
significantly different across online and offline channels, and households do not seem to respond to 
promotions by buying more in the online store than in the offline store (Table 4). Thus, we can ignore 
the purchase quantity effect while modeling households’ purchase incidence and brand choice across the 
two channels.   
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
Table 5 lists the numbers of trips and purchase incidences in the two offline zones and at the online 
store. Consistent with the larger online baskets, households are more likely to make purchases on an 
online trip than on offline trip: 39.2% of online trips involve purchases, compared to 15.3% for offline 
trips. Table 6 reports the mean prices and conditional market shares of each item. There are three brands 
and 15 items. Tarradella is the largest brand, with 79.8% market share, and the private label has 15.7% 
market share. Private labels have a higher market share in the online store (19.3%) than the offline stores 
(14.0%), which implies that households are more likely to shop private labels online than offline. 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
4. Model Setup 
                                                 
5 We confirmed with the retailer that this category is not used as a loss leader. 
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4.1 Demand model 
We follow the standard random utility approach for the demand model. We assume that on a given 
shopping trip, a household either chooses an alternative that gives it the highest utility in the category, or 
chooses not to buy in the category. We do not model a household’s store choice decision explicitly, but 
rather focus on purchase incidence and brand choice because we believe that store choice is a complex 
issue, and a single category rarely drives a household’s store choice decision (Chintagunta et al. 2010). 
This is particularly true for small basket-share categories. On a trip in week t, household h’s indirect 
utility of choosing alternative  (brand j of size b and flavor f) from store s is given by:  
         (1) 
h is household h’s intrinsic preference for alternative , which is the sum of its intrinsic preference for 
brand j, size b, and flavor f, h =hj +hb +hf.  includes family size, number of preschool children, 
number of elders, income, distance to the closest offline store, and its quadratic term.  is the vector of 
the effects of demographics on purchase incidence.  and are indicators for online and offline 
purchases, andh,on  and h,off  are online and offline price coefficients. Yh is income and Pst is retail 
price in store s in week t. hst is household idiosyncratic utility, and st is unobserved attributes—i.e., 
factors such as features or displays that are not part of our data but could influence household utilities. 
These could potentially be correlated with price. The no-purchase utility is: 
         (2) 
where Xht includes the following variables: (1) weather and weekday dummies, (2) purchase quantity for 
the last trip/household size, (3) indicator for net-off-pizza basket size exceeding €90 (to check whether a 
household buys pizza only to take advantage of the free delivery option), and (4) an indicator for the 
household’s buying pizza on any of the two most recent trips (to capture inventory effects but mitigate 
, ,( )( )
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the endogeneity problem associated with using inventory or time elapsed since last purchase). 
Differencing the utility of alternative  with that of the outside good and assuming hst follows an 
extreme value distribution yields the logit probability of alternative choice: 
         (3) 
 and Ω is the set of choice alternatives. Intrinsic preferences for product 
attributes vary across households as , , and . We allow the 
distribution of price coefficients and the impact of demographics on price sensitivity to differ across 
online and offline channels, as follows (Chintagunta et al. 2003): 
               (4) 
In addition to the demographics in Dh, DPh also includes (a) an indicator for the store zone in which 
a household resides (to check whether households living in different price zones exhibit different price 
sensitivity) and (b) an indicator for net-off-pizza basket exceeding €90 (to check whether households are 
more price sensitive if buying pizza has no effect on delivery charge). on and off are the effects of 
demographics on online and offline price response. Since alternatives differ in brand, size, and flavor to 
varying degrees, this distributional specification will result in a flexible substitution pattern across 
alternatives, without having to specify a full covariance matrix for heterogeneity across attributes. A 
flexible substitution pattern is important for our pricing experiments. We average the choice 
probabilities across households to obtain alternative ’s market share as: 
                   (5) 
Although we only analyze the optimal pricing strategy for the online store, it is not appropriate to 
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estimate the demand model only using information from online shopping trips. One reason is that this 
will lead to inefficient parameter estimates, as we do not use all data available. Of the households in our 
data, 89.0% shop across both online and offline stores. These households made many fewer online trips 
(6.6) than offline trips (42.8), though their online baskets are three times larger than offline baskets. 
More importantly, a household’s online purchases are not independent of its offline purchases. Using 
online purchases alone may lead to incorrect parameter estimates, as the parameters that maximize the 
likelihood of online purchases are likely to differ from those that maximize the likelihood of all 
purchases, both online and offline.  
4.2 Optimal online pricing 
Given the demand parameters, the next step is to compute optimal prices for the online store. For 
this, we need to derive the retailer’s pricing equations for that store. These are derived under the 
assumption that the retailer maximizes profits in the product category of interest from the online store, 
conditional on the category’s wholesale prices. If prices in the category influence store choice, or if there 
are strong inventory effects, we will have to consider profits from all stores, online and offline, and also 
consider intertemporal effects. Further, as noted previously, we are assuming that there is no store 
competition; this assumption is justified via our choice of product category. In week t, the retailer sets 
prices for all alternatives simultaneously to solve the following optimization problem: 
              (6) 
The first-order condition for alternative  is: 
               (7) 
In matrix form, the system of first-order conditions for all alternatives is: 
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where, Qon, Pon and MCon are, respectively, the vectors of unit sales, retail prices, and marginal costs for 
the online store, and on is the matrix of first derivatives of sales with respect to retail prices with
. This represents a system of Ω equations, with one for each alternative. The 
optimal prices for the retailer are determined by solving: 
                   (8) 
where  is the retail markup for the online store, which is determined by the demand model and 
can be computed once the demand parameters are estimated. , Mon,t is weekly online 
traffic, which is assumed not to vary with the pricing experiments, and Son,t is ’s shares in the online 
store. As the average retail margin across all categories is 25%, MCon is taken to be 75% of current retail 
prices. We check the sensitivity of the results to the assumptions on wholesale prices by assuming MCon 
equals 70% or 80% of retail prices, which is equivalent to assuming 30% or 20% retail margins. 
5. Estimation 
5.1 Estimation of demand function parameters 
We first estimate demand parameters and then use the estimates to conduct various pricing 
experiments at the online store. Demand parameters are estimated by combining maximum likelihood 
estimation (MLE) for the heterogeneity parameters with a two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression to 
recover the mean parameters of the heterogeneity distribution and also to control for potential price 
endogeneity (see Chu et al. 2008 for details). Define the mean utility of alternative  as:  
            (9) 
Define household-specific utility deviations from the mean as: 
  (10) 
Define 
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               (11) 
     (12) 
We can rewrite household h’s choice probability of alternative on trip t as: 
             (13) 
where (.) is the density function for the consumer heterogeneity distribution. Due to the presence of 
unobserved product attribute st, which varies with time and alternative and may be correlated with 
price, we cannot use standard MLE to obtain consistent estimates of mean parameters 𝛼 and ?̅? together 
with the heterogeneity distribution parameters. Instead, we treat st as time-varying alternative 
intercepts. We have 15 items, 3 store zones (2 offline zones and 1 online store), and 50 weeks. 
Estimating time-varying intercepts would imply estimating 15*3*50=2,250 parameters.6 It would be a 
big computational challenge to locate the maximum in such a high dimensional parameter space. To 
simplify computation and ease the computational burden, we use the inversion procedure suggested by 
Berry (1994) and implemented by Goolsbee and Petrin (2004) with individual choice data. Goolsbee and 
Petrin use cross-sectional data, and hence do not need to deal with panel data issues such as unobserved 
heterogeneity. We adapt this approach to handle the panel structure of our data. This approach places 
few restrictions on the distribution of the unobserved product attributes term  (see Appendix 2 for 
details). 
To recover the mean utility parameters, we project the estimated time-varying mean utility onto 
product attributes and prices: 
                                                 
6 Although online prices are the same as the high-price offline zone, we cannot combine data from these two options, since 
price response parameters are channel specific. 
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            (14) 
Prices might be correlated with unobserved (to the econometrician) alternative characteristics. We 
use M exogenous variables Zst to instrument for prices to address the potential price endogeneity 
problem. The endogeneity problem primarily comes from unobserved variables in the offline channel 
such as advertising, because the retailer simply uses the prices of the high-price zone in the offline 
channel as online prices. We use prices of pizza ingredients as instruments, which include flour, bacon, 
pepperoni, and cheese.7 The first-stage R-squared is 82.5%. We stack the into an ΩST ×1 vector 
, the instruments into an  × M matrix Z, the covariates—brand intercepts, alternative attributes, and 
price-channel interactions—into an  × K matrix X, and unobserved product attributes  into an 
ΩST ×1 vector. We assume E(Z'. To control for uncertainty in using the estimated , we use a 
minimum distance procedure that takes the covariance matrix of these estimates  as the 
distance matrix (Chintagunta et al. 2004). Because the covariance matrix is known, we use generalized 
2SLS as: 
                (15) 
Pz =Z(Z'Z)-1Z' is the projection matrix for Z. If unobserved attributes do not account for a notable 
proportion of the variation in  across weeks and alternatives, estimates from the two-stage procedure 
will be roughly the same as the standard random coefficients logit model. An advantage of the two-stage 
approach is that we do not need to make any specific parametric assumptions about the price-generating 
process, nor do we need to specify a parametric distribution for unobserved attributes ξ.  
                                                 
7 The average ratio of the standard deviations of ingredient costs (flour, bacon, cheese, and pepperoni) to their means is 0.37, 
while the average ratio of the standard deviations of frozen pizza’s prices to its means is 0.04. We also include all item 
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5.2 Estimating optimal prices for the online store 
After estimating the parameters in the demand equation, we take the demand parameters and 
marginal costs as given and compute optimal prices for the online store by simultaneously solving the 
system of pricing equations (Equation 8) and demand equations (Equation 5) that correspond to the 
online store. We then compute the retailer’s online profits under the optimal prices and decompose the 
profit changes into changes induced by price change and changes induced by quantity change, as 
follows:  
                 (16) 
where p0 and q0 are original prices and quantities, and p1 and q1 are new prices and quantities. As 
households are less price sensitive in the online store than in offline stores, optimal online prices will be 
higher than the current prices, which will lead to higher retail profits. However, higher retail prices will 
cause demand to decrease, which will partially offset the profit increase. The final impact on 
profitability is a balance between these two opposing forces. 
6. Estimation Results 
6.1 Estimates of demand parameters 
We report demand model estimates for the frozen pizza category in Table 7. The first two columns 
in the upper panel are, respectively, 2SLS results from the model with and without unobserved 
household heterogeneity, and the last column contains estimated standard deviations of the 
heterogeneity distribution.8 The middle panel reports the mean demographic effects on purchase 
incidence and price sensitivities across the two channels, and the lower panel contains the effects of the 
no-purchase shifters. A comparison of parameter estimates from the OLS and 2SLS models reveals the 
importance of accounting for price endogeneity, while a comparison of parameter estimates from the 
                                                 
8 See Appendix Table A.1 for OLS results.  
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models with and without unobserved household heterogeneity reveals the importance of accounting for 
unobserved consumer heterogeneity.  
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
First, consistent with previous research (e.g., Villas-Boas and Winer 1999), we find that even with 
individual-level data, it is important to account for price endogeneity. For example, after accounting for 
price endogeneity, the average price elasticity from the model with both observed and unobserved 
household heterogeneity goes up from 2.32 to 5.38 for the offline channel, and from 0.66 to 3.66 for the 
online channel.  
We also find that it is important to account for both observed and unobserved household 
heterogeneity. Households are heterogeneous in their intrinsic preferences for brand and product 
attributes and in their price sensitivities. The effects of the great majority of demographics on purchase 
incidence and price sensitivity are significant. We find that large households are more price sensitive, 
which is consistent with economic theory (Becker 1965) and previous research (e.g., Ainslie and Rossi 
1998). A household’s distance to the closest offline store is negatively related to price sensitivity (Figure 
2): The farther a household is from a store, the less price sensitive it is; therefore, distance has a 
marginally decreasing effect on price sensitivity. This is likely because households closer to a store are 
more likely to obtain price and promotion information—e.g., through more store visits. This is 
consistent with Fox and Hoch’s (2005) finding that the propensity to cherry pick is inversely related to 
shoppers’ geographic distance to nearby stores. Moreover, in the segment of distance observed in the 
data (0.1 km to 1.3 km), the relationship between distance and price sensitivity is almost linear. Income 
is negatively related to price sensitivity: The larger the income, the lower the price sensitivity. However, 
the effect is small for pizza and other categories.9 The coefficient for the basket-size indicator is 
                                                 
9 Interactive coefficients are around 0.01 for both liquid dish detergent and packed oranges.  
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positive, implying that households are less price sensitive once their basket size, excluding pizza, 
exceeds the free-delivery threshold. This is because large-basket trips are more likely to be planned trips 
and less likely to be cherry-picking trips than small-basket trips, and households are less price sensitive 
on planned trips. 
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
We now examine the effects of mean utility drivers for the no-purchase option. (1) The effect of 
basket size and free delivery threshold. When a household’s net-off-pizza basket already exceeds the 
free delivery threshold, the household is more likely to purchase frozen pizza, in both online and offline 
trips, as the coefficient for the no-purchase option is significantly negative, and the effect is more 
pronounced for offline trips than for online trips. This implies that a household seldom considers 
individual categories on a large-basket trip, which is consistent with the fact that large-basket trips are 
more likely to be planned trips. (2) Lagged purchase quantity and previous purchase indicators. We 
expect that the more a household buys on previous trips, the less likely it will buy on the current trip. We 
get the opposite result: The coefficients are negative, implying that households are more likely to make a 
purchase, particularly through the online channel, though the effects are not large. This means that we 
can ignore the store choice effect in our pricing experiments, since pizza inventory is not driving store 
trip decision.  
Households are less price sensitive when shopping online than offline; see Table 8 for elasticity 
estimates. The average (unconditional) online price elasticity is 1.88, which is about 49.34% of the 
offline price elasticity (3.81). Estimated price elasticities are asymptotically normally distributed 
(Amemiya 1986). We use bootstrapping to compute the asymptotic covariance matrix and conduct a 
mean difference test (Johnson & Wichern 2002) on the vectors of online and offline own- and cross-
price elasticities. We find that online-offline elasticity differences are statistically significant at the 5% 
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level. Our rationale is that consumers use the online channel when travel cost is high, or time is pressing. 
In addition, the €90 free delivery threshold also pushes consumers to buy more as shown in Figure 1. 
These factors together make online consumers less sensitive in prices.  
The substitution pattern across items is very flexible, as reflected by the means, standard deviations, 
and ratios of maximum/minimum of cross-price elasticities (Table 8). A flexible substitution is 
important for our pricing experiments. The substitution pattern also makes intuitive sense. As expected, 
items belonging to the same brand are closer substitutes, as are items of similar size.  
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
To summarize, the key findings from our demand analysis are as follows. Consistent with the 
literature, we find that it is important to account for price endogeneity and observed and unobserved 
consumer heterogeneity. Household demographics influence both purchase incidence and price 
response. Large households are more price sensitive, and households living farther away from a physical 
store are less price sensitive. Income has a significant yet small effect on price sensitivity. Households 
are less price sensitive when shopping online than offline. Consumers’ lower online price sensitivity 
implies that the retailer is doing the right thing in terms of the direction of pricing for the online store: It 
uses high-price offline zone prices for its Internet store. What is the right price for the online store? To 
answer this question, we need to compute optimal prices for the online store based on consumers’ online 
price sensitivities.  
6.2 Optimal online pricing 
In Table 9, we report optimal prices for items in the frozen pizza category in the online store and 
their impact on profits under different assumptions regarding wholesale prices and three different 
pricing scenarios—“unconstrained,” “constrained,” and “truncated.” Unconstrained prices refer to 
optimal prices obtained by simultaneously solving the system of online pricing equations and demand 
equations. Constrained prices refer to optimal prices obtained under the constraint that the mean of the 
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optimal prices equals the mean of observed online prices. Truncated prices refer to optimal prices 
obtained by setting a ceiling for optimal item prices not to exceed maximum observed online item 
prices.  
[Insert Table 9 about here] 
(1) Unconstrained optimal prices. Since consumers are less price sensitive when shopping online, 
optimal online prices are, on average, higher than current prices10. Optimal online prices for frozen pizaa 
on average are 26.95% higher than current prices under the uniform 25% margin assumption. There exist 
large variations in optimal prices across items. For instance, the optimal online price for the 425g private 
label pizza is 37.66% higher than the current price, while it is only 10.29% higher for the 340g Buitoni 
pizza. If the retailer adopts the optimal online prices, its profits will increase by 17.95%. Given that 
grocery items usually have a very low margin, the profit increase is considerable. 
We decompose the profit change into two sources: profit change due to change in prices only and 
profit change due to change in quantities only. A price increase will lead to a profit increase, which is 
partially offset by the quantity decrease caused by higher prices. This pattern holds under all scenarios 
and across all categories, but to varying degrees. For example, under the 25% margin assumption, the 
price increase results in a 63.99% profit increase. But the price increase also leads to a quantity decrease, 
which in turn leads to a 45.04% decrease in total profits. The net effect is positive.  
One question is whether consumers would stop shopping in this category at the online store if the 
optimal prices are adopted. Since we are recommending an approximately 26.95% increase in prices in 
this category, we check whether price variation to this extent has been seen in previous data. If it has, we 
are more likely to believe that consumers may be willing to accept such a price change, especially since 
frozen pizza accounts for a small proportion of the basket value. In particular, we want to check whether 
                                                 
10 This is consistent with some online grocers’ pricing behavior. For example, www.peapod.com, a leading pure online grocer 
in the US, charges higher prices than its offline counterparts. 
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a 26.95% increase in the frozen pizza category, as recommended by the optimal prices above, has 
previously been encountered by consumers. In this category, the average highest price across all items is 
9% higher than the average lowest price in the online store. The average highest price across items that 
were ever promoted is 27% higher than the lowest price. For some items, such as 340g and 410g Buitoni 
pizzas, the highest prices are over 50% higher than the lowest prices. Moreover, frozen pizza is a small-
ticket item, and its price increase will have a negligible impact on the household’s budget. For example, 
the average price for a 500g frozen pizza is €3.0. A 26.95% price increase corresponds to an increase of 
81 cents. Households on average make 2.5 online purchases of frozen pizza in a year, and each purchase 
is on average 558g. A 26.95% price increase therefore implies €2.26 net increase in the annual grocery 
budget (€2,150 per household within the retail chain), or 4 cents per week. Consumers may not pay 
attention to such a small increase. Nevertheless, such a price increase across all categories is likely to 
trigger a negative reaction from consumers. Hence, we next explore several alternative pricing schemes. 
(2) Constrained prices—the importance of store image. If the retailer is really concerned about the 
price image of the online store, it may not prefer an upward level shift in all prices. Hence we also 
conduct a pricing experiment under the constraint that the mean of the optimal prices across all items 
equals the mean of the observed online prices, as in Montgomery (1997) and Khan and Jain (2005). 
Given the constrained nature of the pricing exercise, we expect the profit improvement in this case to be 
muted relative to the unconstrained case. We find the retail profit would increase by 3.40%.  
(3) Truncated prices—restricting the highest prices. If the retailer wants to adopt the optimal online 
prices we suggest—but also wants to set a ceiling for the item prices to not exceed the highest item 
prices that are observed in the data—we can redo the pricing experiment by replacing those prices 
higher than the highest item prices with the highest item prices. In this way, we truncate prices higher 




6.3 Online zone pricing 
Zone pricing is widely practiced by grocery retailers in physical stores (e.g., the Dominick’s 
database at the University of Chicago reveals such a pricing pattern, in which the retailer under study 
has two price zones for its offline stores). The one-to-one interactive nature of online shopping renders 
the online store an ideal place for price discrimination, because it can easily track consumers’ shopping 
and browsing activities and set different prices for different consumers for the same good. Surprisingly, 
all online stores charge consumers in the same broad geographic market (e.g., Peapod in the Chicago 
market) the same prices—although, for example, Peapod charges different prices in Chicago and 
Boston. Our demand estimates reveal that consumers who live farther from physical stores are less price 
sensitive. This implies that the retailer can adopt virtual zone pricing for the online store as well, by 
charging prices based on households’ distance to the closest physical store.  
To examine the potential effect of zone pricing, we use the household’s distance to the store as a 
zone measurement. We first use 0.65 km11 as the cutoff point for two pricing zones. Online zone pricing 
will further increase retail profits over uniform optimal online prices by 7.07% under the 25% margin 
assumption. We then vary the cutoff point of the two pricing zones and obtain similar results. This is due 
to the almost linear correlation between consumers’ price sensitivities and distance to stores (Figure 2), 
although we estimate a quadratic relationship between them. The results are shown in Table 10. 
[Insert Table 10 about here] 
To explore the optimal number of online pricing zones, we increase the number of pricing zones to 
three. We find that more pricing zones do not significantly increase profits (Table 14): The profit of 
three pricing zones is €7030.26, which is about €15 higher than the profits of two pricing zones for pizza 
under a 25% margin. The changes in profits from two pricing zones to three are also negligible for other 
categories. Theoretically, the increased profit from zone pricing is determined by the degree of 
                                                 
11 This roughly divides households into two groups of equal size. 
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consumer heterogeneity in price sensitivity among online users. The higher the degree of consumer 
heterogeneity, the more pricing zones are needed. Our inference is that two pricing zones are sufficient 
to capture online users’ heterogeneity for this retailer. More pricing zones will be needed if the 
heterogeneity among online users is sufficiently large.  
Usually consumers do not want to be charged differently from their neighbors for identical items, as 
exemplified in Amazon’s failed attempt to charge different consumers different prices (Professional 
Pricing Society, 2002). But online zone pricing can still be implemented under the guise of zone 
promotions—i.e., by offering deeper discounts to those living closer to a physical store than to those 
living farther away. Technically, it is possible to charge different consumers different prices, because 
households must enter their postal code or customer ID in order to shop online and get delivery. It is 
certainly possible for an online grocer to charge different prices based on households’ distance to the 
physical store. The willingness to do so, however, would still be a significant hurdle to overcome. Since 
it is difficult for households to learn that they are being charged differently from their neighbors for the 
same grocery items, this scheme may be worth exploring, at least for certain items that do not make up a 
significant proportion of a household’s basket.  
6.4 Optimal prices and zone pricing for other categories 
We also conduct optimal pricing experiments for liquid dish detergent (Table 11) and packed 
oranges (Table 12), as well as online zone pricing for these categories (Tables 13 and 14). In all 
categories, households are less price sensitive when shopping online than offline: The average ratios of 
online price elasticities to offline ones are 0.51 and 0.711 for liquid dish detergent and packed oranges, 
respectively. Optimal online prices are always higher than actual prices: 37% higher for liquid dish 
detergent and 31% higher for packed oranges under the 25% margin assumption. If the retailer adopts 
the optimal online prices, its profits would increase by 37.80% and 24.19% for liquid dish detergent and 
packed oranges, respectively. If the retailer is concerned about its price image and adopts a constrained 
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optimal pricing, the profits will still increase by 3.96% and 5.58%, respectively, for liquid dish detergent 
and packed oranges. If the retailer imposes the optimal prices that do not exceed the highest observed 
item prices, its profits will increase by 3.33% and 16.33%, respectively.  
[Insert Table 11 about here] 
[Insert Table 12 about here] 
The retailer can also experiment with zone pricing for these categories. We first use two pricing 
zones and vary the cutoff points. We find a significant profit increase from zone pricing with two zones 
compared with uniform online pricing, and similar profits from different cutoff points. Then we increase 
the number of pricing zones to three and find negligible price changes: €8 and €4 for liquid dish 
detergent and packed oranges, respectively. These two categories exhibit a pattern consistent with that of 
the frozen pizza category. Our explanation is that differences in price sensitivity among a same set of 
consumers are not likely to vary across categories. 
 [Insert Table 14 about here] 
6.5 Robustness checks  
We check whether our parameter estimates and conclusions are sensitive to model specifications. 
Similar to Chu et al. (2008), we checked the sensitivity of our estimates to the specification of the 
variance-covariance matrix, the number of trips, purchase incidence and basket size, and the effect of 
regular price change versus promotional price change. We find that our estimates are not sensitive to 
these changes. In particular, we checked how the results will change with different assumptions on 
wholesale prices or retail marginal costs. While the retailer’s judgment of a 25% gross margin relates to 
a broad range of categories, the actual margins in the categories used in our analysis might be higher or 
lower than 25%. To test how sensitive our estimates are to this assumption, we compute the optimal 
prices and optimal zone prices under the assumption that the marginal costs are 70% (30% margin) or 
80% (20% margin) of observed prices for all categories. The basic conclusions hold across all 
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assumptions on marginal costs, though the magnitudes differ substantially, as expected. The higher the 
marginal costs, the higher the optimal prices, and the higher the increase in retail profitability. 
7. Discussion 
In this paper, we explore a grocery retailer’s optimal pricing problem for an online store with 
individual household panel data. We first estimate a mixed logit demand system that allows for channel-
specific price sensitivity and accounts for both observed and unobserved consumer heterogeneity, as 
well as price endogeneity. We find that households are less price sensitive when shopping online. 
Consequently, the retailer’s current policy of charging prices for the online store in line with the higher-
price offline zone seems justified. Nevertheless, we find that the retailer may be able to improve online 
store profits by employing the lower price sensitivity in its online channel and charging category profit-
maximizing prices for online purchase. Unconstrained, the mean optimal online price for frozen pizzas 
would be 27.0% higher than the current price, and the retailer’s profits would increase by 18.0% if the 
optimal online prices were adopted. Even if we impose constraints such as price ceilings and holding 
mean prices of items the same in order to maintain the store’s price image, the retailer can still improve 
its profits. Replicating the analysis for three other product categories, we find unconstrained profit 
improvements in the range of 24-38%.  
Adopting zone pricing in the online store can help retailers/managers to employ the interactive 
nature of online purchases and heterogenous price sensitivities among online consumers, which would 
further increase the retailer’s profits by 7%, 4%, and 14% for pizza, liquid dish detergent, and packed 
oranges, respectively. Therefore, the benefit of zone pricing over uniform optimal pricing is quite 
impactful, given a grocery’s normal retail margin of 25%-30%. Through the variation of cutoff points 
and number of pricing zones in pricing experiments, we infer that: (1) the optimal cutoff points of 
pricing zones depend on the concavity of the relationship between price sensitivity and distance, and (2) 
the optimal number of online pricing zones depends on the degree of online consumer heterogeneity in 
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price sensitivity.   
The limitations of this study are as follows, 1) our model ignores the choice of channels, 2) our main 
results are for categories that do not result in store traffic effects, and do not show quantity variation 
(other than size). This suggests immediate directions for future work. Extension to a model that 
explicitly incorporates the channel and purchase quantity decision seems a reasonable objective. As is 
shown in Table 4, we see that an identical price reduction across channels does not result in a bigger 
online response in purchase quantity than in the offline channel. Nevertheless, the actual quantity 
purchased could vary across channels and needs to be considered. Modeling store-traffic effects presents 
a more serious challenge, but one that will have to be addressed eventually if one seeks to solve the 
retailer’s overall online pricing problem. The challenge is that the information available to the household 
at the time of making the store choice decision is typically not observed in the data. Another direction 
for future work is to combine online zone pricing with some type of second-degree price discrimination, 
such as quantity discounts (Khan and Jain 2005), or to try customized pricing for the online store to 
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Figure 1: Frequencies of Basket Size between €60 and €120 
 
Figure 2: Price Sensitivity, Purchase Incidence with the Distance to Store 
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Table 1: Channel-specific Shopping Behavior by Shopper Type 
 Online Offline Total 
# of trips: all shoppers 7.2 36.1 43.3 
                 Pure online shoppers 13.0  13.0 
                 Pure offline shoppers  49.0 49.0 
                 Mixed shoppers 6.6 42.8 49.4 
Mean basket size (€): all shoppers 128.0 43.0 56.0 
                 Pure online shoppers 121.2  121.2 
                 Pure offline shoppers   43.1 43.1 
                 Mixed shoppers 129.5 43.3 54.6 
# of categories/trip: all shoppers 27.1 12.3 14.4 
                 Pure online shoppers 22.1  22.1 
                 Pure offline shoppers  12.5 12.5 
                 Mixed shoppers 28.5 12.0 14.2 
# of items/trip: all shoppers 38.8 16.0 19.5 
                 Pure online shoppers 31.4  31.4 
                 Pure offline shoppers  16.7 16.7 
                 Mixed shoppers 40.5 15.9 19.1 
 
Table 2: Household Demographics by Zone 
 Low-price zone High-price zone Total 
 Mean Std dev Mean Std dev Mean Std dev 
Family size 3.38 1.16 3.62 1.47 3.56 1.38 
# of pre-school children (<6) 0.56 0.72 0.52 0.88 0.56 0.83 
# of school-age children (6-18) 0.51 0.79 0.65 1.02 0.60 0.95 
# of adults (19-65) 2.23 0.84 2.38 1.05 2.33 0.98 
# of elders (> 65) 0.08 0.35 0.07 0.30 0.07 0.32 
Distance to closest store (km) 0.57 0.35 0.77 0.31 0.69 0.34 
 
Table 3: Effect of Category Promotions on Store Traffic and Purchase Incidence*  













Promotion weeks   
   Mean 1,604 322 3,787 3,453 2,643 1,133 
   Std deviation 185 45 425 378 275 100 
Non-promotion weeks       
   Mean  1,622 294 2,461 2,138 2,413 1,009 
   Std deviation 109 40 284 320 411 159 
t-stats on test of 
mean difference 
-0.38 1.86 2.55 3.44 2.32 3.30 
         *Only including those households who made at least one purchase in the category.  
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Table 4: Purchase Quantity by Channel: Frozen Pizza 
 Packs/trip Grams/trip Average  
pack size  Mean Std dev Mean Std dev 
Promotion weeks      
Online 1.30 0.62 558 266 430 
Offline 1.20 0.50 510 211 426 
Ratio (online/offline) 1.09  1.09   
Non-promotion weeks      
Online 1.27 0.59 549 261 431 
Offline 1.21 0.54 518 237 427 
Ratio (online/offline) 1.05  1.06   
Overall      
Online 1.29 0.61 555 264 430 
Offline 1.20 0.51 513 219 427 
Ratio (online/offline) 1.08  1.08   
 
Table 5: Shopping Trips and Purchase Incidences of Frozen Pizza 
 
 
Table 6: Prices and Market Shares of Frozen Pizza by Price Zone 
Brand Size (g) Flavor 










Buitoni 340 Cheese 7.95 8.46 1.76 2.09 3.15 
Buitoni 410 Cheese 7.81 7.87 3.30 2.28 3.98 
Buitoni 600 Cheese 8.35 8.70 1.67 1.65 2.97 
Private label 425 Cheese 4.92 5.02 5.18 6.46 7.73 
Private label 450 Bacon/ham 4.65 4.73 10.12 6.94 11.55 
Tarradella 350 Others 6.15 6.26 3.30 7.07 6.07 
Tarradella 410 Cheese 5.37 5.49 15.46 15.76 13.49 
Tarradella 425 Bacon/ham 5.18 5.29 7.87 3.63 4.68 
Tarradella 425 Others 5.18 5.29 4.35 3.65 5.81 
Tarradella 425 Ham/cheese 5.18 5.29 11.66 15.05 10.65 
Tarradella 435 Others 5.06 5.17 15.46 12.68 8.71 
Tarradella 450 Others 4.89 5.00 3.95 2.87 4.57 
Tarradella 650 Ham/cheese 5.88 6.08 1.39 1.69 2.04 
Tarradella 2x225 Cheese 6.40 6.78 5.15 6.99 5.97 
Tarradella 2x225 Bacon/ham 6.40 6.78 9.38 11.18 8.63 
Mean/total   5.96 6.15    100   100      100 
 # of trips # of purchases Purchase incidence (%) 
Low-price zone 19,603 3,241 16.53 
High-price zone 36,138 5,261 14.56 
Online  9,872 3,870 39.20 
Total  65,613 12,372 18.86 
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With unobserved heterogeneity 
 2SLS 2SLS Heterogeneity 
Buitoni (aj) -3.172(0.280) -2.007(0.310) 1.095(0.041) 
Private label (aj) -3.173(0.173) -3.021(0.192) 1.605(0.014) 
Tarradella (aj) -2.897(0.185) -1.806(0.204) 0.944(0.018) 
Size1 (600g) (ab) 0.173(0.080) 0.175(0.089) 0.128(0.030) 
Size2 (425g) (ab) -0.109(0.052) -0.139(0.057) 0.215(0.030) 
Size3 (410g) (ab) 0.473(0.070) 0.421(0.078) 0.324(0.030) 
Size4 (350g) (ab) 0.641(0.085) 0.275(0.094) 1.110(0.010) 
Size5 (435g) (ab) 1.121(0.075) 0.953(0.083) 0.563(0.027) 
Size6 (650g) (ab) -1.360(0.086) -1.319(0.095) 0.115(0.041) 
Size7 (2x225g) (ab) 0.415(0.087) -0.072(0.096) 1.293(0.036) 
Flavor1 (cheese) (af) 0.788(0.077) 0.778(0.085) 0.511(0.033) 
Flavor2 (bacon/ham) (af) 0.921(0.059) 0.920(0.065) 0.247(0.030) 
Mean online price (bon) -0.242(0.035) -4.463(0.384) 0.178(0.005) 
Mean offline price (boff) -0.429(0.035) -6.574(0.389) 0.004(0.003) 
Demographic on incidence 
()       
  Closest distance -0.466(0.073) -0.519(0.043)  
  Closest distance^2 0.003(0.056) -0.172(0.030)  
  Family size  0.125(0.009) 0.117(0.031)  
  Children -0.150(0.017) -0.225(0.040)  
  Elders -0.579(0.036) -0.461(0.047)  
Price-demo interaction (): Online Offline Online Offline  
  Closest distance -0.216(0.107) 0.765(0.066) 0.477(0.202) 1.144(0.159)  
  Closest distance^2 0.417(0.089) -0.165(0.029) 0.708(0.097) 0.103(0.094)  
  Family size  -0.198(0.017) -0.205(0.014) -0.178(0.055) -0.222(0.054)  
  Children 0.152(0.026) 0.108(0.027) 0.277(0.063) 0.287(0.067)  
  Elders 0.302(0.041) 0.531(0.052) 0.227(0.094) 0.372(0.071)  
  Household zone -0.194(0.064) -0.075(0.031) -0.272(0.075) -0.095(0.037)  
  Basket size threshold  0.181(0.019) 0.209(0.134) 0.166(0.019) -0.218(0.035)  
  Income 0.031(0.001) 0.025(0.001) 0.035(0.001) 0.022(0.006)  
Effect on no-purchase () Online Offline Online Offline  
  Weather dummy 0.042(0.006) 0.021(0.025) 0.046(0.024) 0.010(0.014)  
  Weekday dummy 0.067(0.007) 0.307(0.007) 0.044(0.011) 0.282(0.025)  
  Lagged purchase quantity -0.738(0.010) -0.347(0.038) -0.464(0.012) 0.011(0.019)  
  Previous purchase indicator -0.906(0.013) -0.454(0.023) -0.553(0.026) -0.109(0.024)  
  Basket size threshold 0.016(0.025) -0.795(0.080) -0.028(0.016) -1.085(0.029)  







Table 8: Own and Cross Price Elasticities by Channel* 










   Mean Std Max/min   Mean Std Max/min 
Buitoni 340g -2.32 0.02 0.04 4.30 -5.21 0.01 0.02 4.25 
Buitoni 600g -2.01 0.02 0.03 3.77 -5.47 0.02 0.02 5.01 
Private label 425g -1.65 0.04 0.05 5.69 -3.06 0.04 0.04 6.40 
Private label 450g -1.51 0.05 0.07 5.41 -2.90 0.05 0.05 7.21 
Buitoni 410g -2.03 0.03 0.04 4.42 -4.66 0.02 0.03 5.12 
Tarradella 350g -1.98 0.02 0.06 2.44 -3.88 0.01 0.04 2.73 
Tarradella 410g -1.78 0.03 0.12 2.06 -3.39 0.03 0.14 2.06 
Tarradella 425g -1.82 0.01 0.04 2.50 -3.38 0.01 0.04 2.63 
Tarradella 425g -1.94 0.01 0.05 2.49 -3.42 0.01 0.03 2.63 
Tarradella 425g -1.82 0.03 0.09 2.68 -3.35 0.03 0.11 2.29 
Tarradella 435g -1.72 0.02 0.07 2.45 -3.17 0.03 0.11 2.41 
Tarradella 450g -1.83 0.01 0.04 2.82 -3.21 0.01 0.03 2.55 
Tarradella 650g -1.89 0.01 0.02 2.10 -3.95 0.00 0.01 2.75 
Tarradella 2x225g -1.99 0.03 0.07 4.30 -4.09 0.05 0.07 6.06 
Tarradella 2x225g -1.95 0.04 0.09 4.35 -3.99 0.06 0.11 5.71 




Table 9：Online Pricing and the Impact on Retail Profitability—Frozen Pizza 
 25% margin  Unconstrained 
 Unconstrained1 Constrained2 Truncated3 20% margin 30% margin 
Buitoni 340g 9.26 9.22 9.36 9.77 8.90 
Buitoni 410g 8.82 8.79 8.92 9.40 8.50 
Buitoni 600g 9.44 9.03 9.20 10.02 9.07 
Private label 425g 6.90 5.30 5.41 7.39 6.72 
Private label 450g 6.66 5.02 5.11 7.19 6.50 
Tarradella 350g 8.37 6.45 6.57 8.67 8.11 
Tarradella 410g 8.33 5.65 5.76 8.73 8.07 
Tarradella 425g 7.78 5.45 5.55 8.13 7.54 
Tarradella 425g 7.20 5.45 5.55 7.65 7.00 
Tarradella 425g 7.02 5.45 5.55 7.71 6.83 
Tarradella 435g 7.00 5.33 5.43 7.63 6.81 
Tarradella 450g 7.02 5.15 5.25 7.59 6.83 
Tarradella 650g 6.91 6.26 6.38 7.59 6.73 
Tarradella 2x225g 6.78 6.98 7.12 7.15 6.60 
Tarradella 2x225g 7.60 6.98 7.12 7.74 7.37 
Mean 7.67 6.43 6.55 8.16 7.44 
New Profits (€) 6,604.92 5,790.00 5,821.94 6,020.92 7,233.64 
Original profits (€) 5,599.72 5,599.72 5,599.72 4,479.78 6,719.66 
Profit change 
    (€) 











Profit change due to      
  Price increase  
    (€) 











  Quantity decrease 
    (€) 












“Unconstrained”: optimal prices obtained by solving the first-order conditions for the online store 
“Constrained”: constrain the mean of the optimal prices to equal the mean of the observed prices 
“Truncated”: if optimal prices exceed the max item prices in the data, replace with the max item price 




Table 10：Profit from Online Zone Pricing V.S. Online Pricing—Frozen Pizza 




























0.3 1,696.02 5,314.77 7,010.79 6,399.25 7,667.51 
0.5 2,323.45 4,679.77 7,003.22 6,391.83 7,659.35 
0.6 3,444.72 3,555.93 7,000.65 6,388.98 7,657.30 
0.7 3,457.95 3,542.95 7,000.90 6,389.23 7,657.55 
0.8 5,232.15 1,771.75 7,003.90 6,392.83 7,660.03 
0.9 5,908.07 1,098.15 7,006.22 6,395.23 7,662.12 
1.1 6,208.06 805.53 7,013.59 6,402.11  7,669.88 
Note: Zone 1—households’ distance to the closest physical store smaller than the cutoff point;  
 
Table 11：Online Pricing and the Impact on Retail Profitability—Liquid Dish Detergent 
 25% margin Unconstrained 
 unconstrained Constrained Truncated 20% margin 30% margin  
Mean of optimal/observed prices 1.37 1.02 1.02 1.41 1.32 
New Profits(€) 5,116.15 3,859.86 3,836.47 4,678.76 5,595.94 
Original Profits(€) 3,712.83 3,712.83 3,712.83 2,970.27 4,455.40 
Profit change  
        (€) 
















Profit change due to      
   Price increase 
      (€) 
















  Quantity decrease  
      (€) 

















Table 12：Online Pricing and the Impact on Retail Profitability—Packed Oranges 
 25% margin Unconstrained 
 unconstrained Constrained Truncated 20% margin 30% margin  
Mean of optimal/observed prices 1.31 1.03 1.18 1.36 1.26 
New Profits(€) 872.61 741.85 817.38 801.52 949.93 
Original profits(€) 702.64 720.64 702.64 562.11 843.17 
Profit change  
        (€) 
















Profit change due to      
   Price increase 
      (€) 
















  Quantity decrease  
      (€) 


















Table 13： Profit change from Online Zone Pricing V.S. Online Pricing—Other Categories 
Liquid Dish Detergent 































0.3 1,141.01 4,121.35 5,262.36 4,813.69 5,754.11 
0.5 1,574.85 3,687.62 5,262.47 4,813.89 5,754.23 
0.6 2,471.97 2,790.60 5,262.57 4,813.92 5,754.24 
0.7 2,476.34 2,786.18 5,262.52 4,813.87 5,754.19 
0.8 3,873.12 1,390.16 5,263.28 4,814.77 5,755.06 
0.9 4,398.46 865.03 5,263.49 4,814.99 5,755.29 
1.1 4,642.51 620.69 5263.21 4,814.55 5,754.98 
Packed Oranges 































0.3 170.18 803.04 973.22 895.21 1057.44 
0.5 256.97 715.68 972.65 894.33 1056.06 
0.6 408.79 563.45 972.24 895.26 1057.35 
0.7 408.79 563.45 972.24 895.68 1057.35 
0.8 691.56 282.46 974.02 895.96 1058.91 
0.9 803.76 170.28 974.04 895.99 1058.94 




Table 14: Online Zone Pricing—More zones* 
 Pizza Liquid Dish Detergent Packed Orange 
Margin 25% 20% 30% 25% 20% 30% 25% 20% 30% 
Profits of 3 Zones(€) 7,030.26 6,421.35 7,679.59 5,271.07 4,827.34 5,760.71 978.66 902.88 1,062.63 
Original Profits(€) 5,599.72 4,479.78 6,719.66 3,712.83 2,970.26 4,455.40 702.64 562.11 843.17 
Profit change  
        (€) 




























Change due to          
  Price increase 
      (€) 




























  Quantity decrease  
      (€) 




























Profits of 2 Zones(€) 7,015.85 6,402.11 7,669.88 5,263.21 4,814.99 5,754.24 974.04 896.32 1058.94 





Table A.1 OLS Demand Model Estimates (Standard Errors): Frozen Pizza 
 
 
Without unobserved heterogeneity With unobserved heterogeneity 
 OLS OLS 
Buitoni (aj) -5.019(0.277) -4.879(0.302) 
Private label (aj) -4.252(0.171) -4.698(0.187) 
Tarradella (aj) -4.112(0.182) -3.696(0.199) 
Size1 (600g) (ab) 0.073(0.079) 0.019(0.087) 
Size2 (425g) (ab) -0.118(0.051) -0.153(0.056) 
Size3 (410g) (ab) 0.519(0.070) 0.492(0.076) 
Size4 (350g) (ab) 0.371(0.084) -0.145(0.092) 
Size5 (435g) (ab) 1.110(0.075) 0.936(0.081) 
Size6 (650g) (ab) -1.535(0.085) -1.593(0.092) 
Size7 (2x225g) (ab) 0.115(0.086) -0.538(0.094) 
Flavor1 (cheese) (af) 0.686(0.076) 0.619(0.083) 
Flavor2 (bacon/ham) (af) 0.876(0.058) 0.851(0.064) 
Mean online price (bon) -0.065(0.343) -0.800(0.374) 
Mean offline price (boff) -1.881(0.348) -2.835(0.379) 
Demographic on incidence ()      
  Closest distance -0.466(0.073) -0.519(0.043) 
  Closest distance^2 0.003(0.056) -0.172(0.030) 
  Family size  0.125(0.009) 0.117(0.031) 
  Children -0.150(0.017) -0.225(0.040) 
  Elders -0.579(0.036) -0.461(0.047) 
Price-demo interaction (): Online Offline Online Offline 
  Closest distance -0.216(0.107) 0.765(0.066) 0.477(0.202) 1.144(0.159) 
  Closest distance^2 0.417(0.089) -0.165(0.029) 0.708(0.097) 0.103(0.094) 
  Family size  -0.198(0.017) -0.205(0.014) -0.178(0.055) -0.222(0.054) 
  Children 0.152(0.026) 0.108(0.027) 0.277(0.063) 0.287(0.067) 
  Elders 0.302(0.041) 0.531(0.052) 0.227(0.094) 0.372(0.071) 
  Household zone -0.194(0.064) -0.075(0.031) -0.272(0.075) -0.095(0.037) 
  Basket size threshold  0.181(0.019) 0.209(0.134) 0.166(0.019) -0.218(0.035) 
  Income 0.031(0.001) 0.025(0.001) 0.035(0.001) 0.022(0.006) 
Effect on no-purchase () Online Offline Online Offline 
  Weather dummy 0.042(0.006) 0.021(0.025) 0.046(0.024) 0.010(0.014) 
  Weekday dummy 0.067(0.007) 0.307(0.007) 0.044(0.011) 0.282(0.025) 
  Lagged purchase quantity -0.738(0.010) -0.347(0.038) -0.464(0.012) 0.011(0.019) 
  Previous purchase indicator -0.906(0.013) -0.454(0.023) -0.553(0.026) -0.109(0.024) 
  Basket size threshold 0.016(0.025) -0.795(0.080) -0.028(0.016) -1.085(0.029) 





Table A.2  2SLS Estimates (Standard Errors): Liquid Dish Detergent & Packed Orange 
 
 Liquid Dish Detergent Packed Orange 
 2SLS Heterogeneity 2SLS Heterogeneity 
Brand 1(aj)   1.404(1.891) 0.444(0.065)  0.755(0.332) 0.836(0.036) 
Brand 2(aj) -1.220(0.849) 1.147(0.028) -0.145(0.318) 1.021(0.046) 
Brand 3(aj) -1.795(0.875) 1.269(0.030) -0.807(0.234) 1.301(0.029) 
Brand 4(aj)  -2.215(0.898) 1.204(0.032)   
Mean online price (bon) -7.363(3.220) 1.365(0.345) -6.449(0.597) 1.530(0.086) 
Mean offline price (boff)             -14.385(3.261) 1.539(0.229) -9.065(0.591) 0.165(0.057) 
Demographic on incidence ()         
  Closest distance 0.175(0.016)  0.128(0.025)  
  Closest distance^2 0.003(0.030)  -0.005(0.014)  
  Family size  0.036(0.010)  0.036(0.013)  
  Children -0.005(0.018)  -0.047(0.047)  
  Elders 0.064(0.019)  -0.007(0.018)  
Price-demo interaction (): Online Offline  Online Offline Offline 
  Closest distance 0.264(0.025) 0.483(0.023)  0.929(0.062) 0.846(0.093)  
  Closest distance^2 0.144(0.032) 0.294(0.051)  0.059(0.215) 0.037(0.193)  
  Family size  0.085(0.031) 0.077(0.022)  -0.702(0.188) -0.109(0.115)  
  Children -0.176(0.035) -0.215(0.032)  1.391(0.535) 0.837(0.416)  
  Elders 0.029(0.019) -0.152(0.049)  -0.515(0.056) -0.663(0.242)  
  Household zone -0.396(0.024) 0.323(0.037)  -2.250(0.085) 0.019(0.204)  
  Basket size threshold  -0.344(0.025) 0.081(0.071)  0.020(0.043) 0.802(0.404)  
  Income 0.536(0.027) 0.332(0.017)  0.020(0.316) 0.013(0.019)  
Effect on no-purchase () Online Offline  Online Offline Offline 
  Weather dummy 0.044(0.009) -0.029(0.006)  0.030(0.063) -0.026(0.035)  
  Weekday dummy -0.032(0.033) 0.043(0.007)  -0.174(0.090) 0.049(0.038)  
  Lagged purchase quantity -0.165(0.067) 0.366(0.011)  -0.073(0.040) 0.003(0.024)  
  Previous purchase indicator 0.114(0.022) 0.231(0.031)  -0.749(0.065) -0.345(0.037)  
  Basket size threshold -0.630(0.039) -1.502(0.035)  -0.082(0.083) -1.296(0.057)  
Value of objective function -34,847 -25,213 
* 4 major brands for Liquid dish detergent, 3 major brands for package orange. 
 
Appendix 2: estimation details 
The estimation method proposed by Goolsbee and Petrin (2004) has two stages. In the 1st stage, we 
concentrate out the likelihood function and only search over the space of {}. This involves the 
following three steps: (1) For any candidate values of { } and vector of mean utilities  (an st x1 
vector), calculate the likelihood that a given household chooses alternative  from store s in week t, and 
integrate over households’ choice probabilities to obtain market shares. (2) Given { }, solve for vector 
 ( that matches observed market shares Sst to model predicted shares ˆ stS  by a nonlinear search 
routine ˆ( ) arg min | |st stS S    . (3) Maximize the likelihood function by choosing { (, }.  
The usual formulas for the standard errors of {} will not apply in this case due to the sampling errors 
in the observed market shares. That is, the market shares calculated from this household panel’s purchases 
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may not be the same as the market shares calculated from all shoppers’ purchases, even though we have 
a large sample. We adjust the standard errors using the approach in Goolsbee and Petrin (2004). 
In the 2nd-stage, we project the estimated ˆ  onto brand intercepts, product attributes and prices to 
recover the mean parameters ( ,  ) (see Equation (9)). In this stage, we use instrumental variables to 
control for the potential price endogeneity problem. We account for the estimation error in ˆ  from the 
1st-stage by using a generalized 2SLS procedure. The technical details of the two-stage estimation are as 
follows. The likelihood of a household h’s purchase history is: 




                        (A2.1) 
Where Ihst = 1 if household h selects alternative  in week t from store s, and 0 otherwise. Since the 
computation of Equation (14) involves evaluating a complex multivariate integral, we use Monte Carlo 
methods to simulate the likelihood (Keane 1993). That is, for each household, we take R draws of h from 
the distribution (.) and simulate the likelihood as:  
1 1 1 1
1ˆ ( )h st
TR
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